Fordham Law School

FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History
Parole Administrative Appeal Briefs

Parole Administrative Appeal Documents

September 2019

Administrative Appeal Brief - FUSL000018 (2019-03-25)

Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aab

Recommended Citation
"Administrative Appeal Brief - FUSL000018 (2019-03-25)" (2019). Parole Information Project
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/aab/1

This Parole Document is brought to you for free and open access by the Parole Administrative Appeal Documents
at FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Parole
Administrative Appeal Briefs by an authorized administrator of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship
and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu.

FUSL000018

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL OF
NEW YORK STATE PAROLE DECISION FOR

Parole Inte1v iew Date: November 7, 2018
Denial Date: November 15, 2018
Inmate Parole Hearing Location: Eastern Con ectional Facility
Parole Panel Location: Poughkeepsie, New York
Notice of Appeal Filed: December 19, 2018

Submitted by:

Submitted on 3/25/2019 to:

Aaron Drew
La Mecia Ross-Tiggett
Legal Interns

Appeals Unit
New York State Board of Parole
Haniman State Campus
Building # 2
1220 Washington Avenue
Albany, NY 12226

Ma1tha Rayner, Esq.
Clinical Associate Professor of Law
Lincoln Square Legal Se1v ices, Inc.
Fordham University School of Law
150 West 62th Street, 9th Floor
New York, New York 10023
212-636-6934

FUSL000018

TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1
I. MR.
WAS DENIED ACCESS TO PORTIONS OF THE PAROLE FILE
CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW ...................................... 2
Mr.
Made a Timely Request for His Parole Case Record but Portions of the
Record Were Withheld or Redacted ................................................................................... 3
Mr
Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the District Attorney Letter ...................... 4
Mr.
Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the “Opposition” Letters Considered by
the Board ............................................................................................................................. 5
Mr.
Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the Medical Summaries in the
Case Record ........................................................................................................................ 6
Mr.
was Denied Access to Separatee Information Contained in the
Case Record ........................................................................................................................ 7
Mr.
was Denied Access to the Full COMPAS Report Prior to the
Parole Interview .................................................................................................................. 8
II. THE PAROLE BOARD BASED ITS DENIAL ON INACCURATE INFORMATION
CONTAINED IN MR.
PAROLE FILE................................................................. 8
The Board’s Claim that the Victim was Shot Six Times is Inaccurate ............................... 9
The Parole Board Based Its Decision on an Inaccurate Criminal Conviction Not
Contained in Mr.
Criminal Record ..................................................................... 10
The Parole Board Relied on COMPAS Information Which Was Based on Erroneous and
Unsubstantiated Information............................................................................................. 10
1. The COMPAS Report Contains an Unsubstantiated Claim of a Propensity for Drug
Abuse .......................................................................................................................... 11
2. The COMPAS Report Erroneously Stated that Mr.
Had No Employment
Plans ............................................................................................................................ 13
3. The COMPAS Report Erroneously Reflects an Unsubstantiated Claim that
Mr.
Would Incur Financial Difficulties Upon Release ................................... 14
III. THE PAROLE BOARD’S DECISION VIOLATES THE POSITIVE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE ................................................ 15
The Board considered “Community Opposition” that Expressed Penal Philosophy ....... 16
The Board Failed to Explain the Reason for Denial in Detail .......................................... 19
The Board Failed to Consider Mr.
Defense Attorney’s Statement..................... 23
The Board Failed to Provide An Individualized Reason for Departing from Eleven Out of
Twelve COMPAS Scores ................................................................................................. 24
The Parole Board Impermissibly Considered “Separatee Information” Without Informing
Mr.
........................................................................................................................ 25
The Parole Board Based Its Denial Solely on the Seriousness of the Instant Offense ..... 25
CONCLUSION ............................................................................................................................. 29

ii

FUSL000018

INTRODUCTION
This brief is submitted in support of the timely filed notice of administrative appeal for Mr.
Mr.

appeared before Commissioners Carol Shapiro, Tana Agostini, and

William Smith via video conference at Eastern Correctional Facility on November 7, 2018. On
November 15, 2018 the Parole Board (hereinafter “Board”) denied Mr.

parole. Mr.

has appeared before the Board on four prior occasions, yet has been denied parole each time. In
1981, Mr.

was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree and Criminal Possession of a

Controlled Substance in the Second Degree. Ex. A. (Rap Sheet). Mr.

was sentenced to 31

years to life and has served 38 years of an indeterminate sentence. Id.

Despite one of the

Commissioners voting for his release, Mr.

was denied parole for the fifth time on

November 15, 2018, as the other two Commissioners chose to keep him incarcerated. As the
foregoing appeal will demonstrate, there are numerous independent errors that require reversal.
As any one of these errors necessitates reversal, Mr.

should be granted a new parole

interview and review in front of a set of commissioners that does not include Commissioners
Agostini and Smith.
First, the Department of Corrections and Community Supervision (hereinafter “DOCCS”)
failed to provide Mr.

access to portions of the case record that were relied on by the Board

in violation of 9NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(i). A finding that any one of the relevant portions were
withheld requires reversal. Second, the Board based its decision on several pieces of inaccurate
information in the case record, each of which warrants reversal. See Matter of Lewis v. Travis, 9
A.D.3d 800, 801 (3rd Dep’t., 2004) (“Inasmuch as the Board relied on incorrect information in
denying petitioner's request for parole release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing
granted.”). Third, the Board relied on “opposition” letters that conveyed penal philosophy in
contradiction of the law. See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994)
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(holding that a commissioner’s use of penal philosophy as a factor for denial was improper).
Lastly, the Board’s decision contained several violations of statutory law each of which is grounds
for a new hearing. See In re Platten v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 47 Misc. 3d 1059 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan
Cnty., 2015) (“In the instant matter, the court finds that the Board failed to meet the statutory
requirements of conduct by rendering a conclusory decision lacking in specificity as required by
the statute, unsupported by the record and petitioner's history of incarceration.”).
I.

MR.
WAS DENIED ACCESS TO PORTIONS OF THE PAROLE FILE
CONSIDERED BY THE BOARD IN VIOLATION OF THE LAW
A parole applicant “may have access to information contained in the parole case record, (i)

prior to a scheduled appearance before the board.” See 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1(i). “The term case
record means any memorandum, document, or other writing pertaining to a present or former
inmate, parolee...and maintained pursuant to sections 259-a(1)-(3) and 259-c(3) of the Executive
Law.” 9 NYCRR 8008.2(a). Additionally, “the term record or records includes tabulations or
other writing, other than a case or employee record, maintained by the division”. See 9 NYCRR
8008.2(b). The parole regulations further provide that a parole applicant “shall be granted access
to those portions of the case record which will be considered by the board or authorized hearing
officer.” 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(i).
The Board has authority to promulgate rules to maintain the confidentiality of records, but
the legislature has placed limits on those restrictions. See Matter of Clark v New York State Bd. of
Parole, 2018 NY Slip Op 30745[U], *1,*6 (Sup. Ct, New York Cnty, 2018], aff’d, 166 A.D.3d
531(1st Dep’t., 2018). The regulations state that, “Access shall not be granted to those portions of
the case record to the extent that they contain:
(1) diagnostic opinions which if known to the releasee could lead to serious disruption of
his institutional program or supervision;
(2) materials which would reveal sources of information obtained upon a promise of
confidentiality; or
2
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(3) any information which if disclosed might result in physical harm or otherwise, to any
person.”
9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1-3).
Furthermore, the Clark court held that while “regulations provide a basis to redact or
withhold records. . .” there must be an appropriate analysis to determine whether disclosing the
information would satisfy or meet any of the exceptions stated above. See id. Therefore, while a
parole applicant does not have complete access to the case record, there are limited exceptions to
information that can be withheld from the parole applicant.
In the instant action, the record establishes that the Board categorically denied Mr.
access to the District Attorney letter, “opposition” letters, portions of the COMPAS, medical
summaries and other documents rather than provide an individualized determination whether the
documents met any of the exceptions to disclosure per 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1)-(3). As a
result, Mr.

was denied access to portions of the parole file considered by the Board in

reaching its decision in violation of 9 NYCRR §§ 8000.5(c)(1) and 8000.5(a)(2)(i). Each portion
of the case record that was impermissibly withheld provides an independent ground for reversal.
Mr.
Made a Timely Request for His Parole Case Record but Portions
of the Record Were Withheld or Redacted
On August 24, 2018, four months prior to his November 2018 parole hearing, Mr.
submitted a written request to review his case record pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1). See Ex.
B. (Rules and Procedures for the Review of Your Guidance and Parole File Form dated August
24, 27 and 30, 2018). On August 27, 2018, Mr.

received a form stating certain documents

would not be made available for review. Id. The form stated that “the following records WILL
NOT be made available for review:
Pre-Sentence/Probation Reports
RAP Sheets
Confidential Reports
Separatee Inforamtion
3
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Evaluative Reports/Evaluative Comments in Chronos
ASAT and Treatment Information
Letters of Support or Against Inmate’s Release
Crime Victim Statements
Parole Board Reports Parts II & III (inmate status reports)”
Id. Additionally, although Mr.

received a copy of the 2018 COMPAS report, it was

redacted. Ex. C. (Redacted COMPAS Report provided to Mr.

On August 30, 2018, Mr.

reviewed his “guidance and parole files” minus the aforementioned withholdings. Ex. A.
As such, Mr.

was denied access to his parole case record in violation of 9 NYCRR §§

8000.5(c)(1) and 8000.5(a)(2)(i).
Mr.

Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the District Attorney Letter

The November 2018 Parole Board report indicates that the Board received an official letter
from the District Attorney (hereinafter “D.A. letter”). See Ex. D. (November 2018 Parole Board
Report). The August 24, 2018 Rule and Procedures form denied Mr.

review of “Letters of

support or against inmate’s release” which includes letters from judges, district attorneys and
defendant’s counsel. Ex. B; Exec. L. 259-i(c)(A)(vii) (stating “recommendations of the sentencing
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate” shall be considered.). Therefore, Mr.
was denied access to the D.A. letter prior to his November 2018 appearance before the Board.
On February 11, 2019, in connection with this appeal, counsel for Mr.

submitted a

request for the production of the case record, including the D.A. letter. Ex. E. (February 11, 2019
Aaron Drew email). In response, on February 12, 2019, Samantha Koolen, Office of Counsel,
DOCCS, stated: “there are no DA, Judge or Defense Attorney letters in the Parole file of
81A1110.” Ex. F.
But, the interview transcript establishes there was a D.A. letter in Mr.

case record.

Commissioner Shapiro states, “Okay. In every case we do reach out to the judge, the DA, and
defense attorney to see if they have any comments for our consideration, in your case it looks like
4
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we do have a letter from the district attorney, which we will now consider.” Ex. G at 14:1720(November 2018 Parole Board Interview and Decision). It appears the D.A. letter was in the
case file and considered, but may have been inadvertently misplaced by the Board. Thus, it was
withheld from Mr.

without any evidence of an appropriate or independent analysis which

would support its withholding in violation of 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1-3) and Clark v. New
York State Board of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531, 532 (1st Dep’t., 2018) (noting Board’s admission that
withholding of letters by “public officials and members of the community” was improper).
Alternatively, if there is, in fact, no District Attorney letter contained in Mr.

case

record as Ms. Koolen avers, then the parole board’s reliance on a document, namely the November
2018 Parole Board report, Ex. D, contained in Mr.

case record that purports receipt of a

District Attorney letter that was never actually received. This is tantamount to reliance on incorrect
information and grounds for a new hearing. 1 See In the Matter of John L. Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d
800, 801 (3d Dept. 2004).
Mr.
Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the “Opposition” Letters
Considered by the Board
The Board considered letters in opposition. Ex. G at 22:19-22. These letters were not
provided to Mr.

prior to his November 2018 parole hearing. Ex. B. This withholding was

“improper.” See Clark, 166 A.D.3d 531, 532 (1st Dep’t., 2018) (noting Board’s admission that
withholding of letters by “public officials and members of the community” was improper).
Additionally, since denying Mr.

access, the Board has provided Mr.

counsel with

letters in opposition pursuant to a request in connection with this administrative appeal. Ex. H.
(January 22, 2019 email from ORC Richard M. Downey); 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1) (iii) (allowing
for access to the parole file “prior to the timely perfecting an administrative appeal of the final

1

The Appeals Unit should conduct an independent review of Mr.
District Attorney.

5
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decision of the board.”). This should be viewed as the Board’s concession that opposition letters
must be disclosed to a parole applicant before the parole interview. 2
Mr.
Was Unlawfully Denied Access to the Medical Summaries in the
Case Record
On August 24, 2018, pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1), Mr.

submitted a written

request to review his case record in preparation for his November 2018 parole hearing. Ex. B. On
August 27, 2018, Mr.

was advised by letter that “Psychiatric Reports, Evaluative

Reports/Evaluative comments in Chronos, ASAT and Treatment Information would be withheld.”
Id. (indicating that “the following records WILL NOT be made available for review...Psychiatric
Reports, Evaluative Reports/Evaluative comments in Chronos, ASAT and Treatment
Information”).
The Board has not identified how these records qualified for withholding under the
regulation. 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1-3). The Board has not offered evidence that it conducted
an appropriate analysis to determine whether disclosing the information would satisfy any of the
exceptions set forth in 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1-3). Specifically, the board has not shown that
the record, (1) contains diagnostic information that would lead to serious disruption of Mr.
institutional program or supervision; (2) would reveal a confidential source; or (3) would result in
physical harm to anyone or otherwise pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(1-3).
Furthermore, since the 2018 November denial, the Board has provided Mr.
counsel with “Confidential Comprehensive Medical Summaries that were part of
Parole folder,” pursuant to a request in connection with this administrative appeal. Ex. I (February
13, 2019 letter from ORC Richard Downey enclosing medical summaries); 9 NYCRR

2 Although Mr.
was provided with the “opposition” letters in connection with this administrative appeal, Mr.
objects to the redaction of senders’ full addresses. The country and state of origin should not be redacted to permit undersigned
counsel to determine the geographical relevancy of such letters.
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8000.5(c)(1) (iii) (allowing for access to the parole file “prior to the timely perfecting an
administrative appeal of the final decision of the board.”). This should be viewed as a concession
by the Board that medical information contained in Mr.
a parole applicant prior to a parole hearing before the Board. As

case record must be disclosed to
was not provided this

information prior to his November 2018 parole hearing, this withholding was improper.
Mr.
was Denied Access to Separatee Information Contained in the
Case Record
On August 24, 2018, four months prior to his November 2018 parole hearing, Mr.
submitted a written request to review his case record pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1). On
August 30, 2018, Mr.

received a form stating “separatee information” will not be accessible

for review. Ex. B. On December 17, 2018, counsel for Mr.

requested his parole file for

the purpose of perfecting this administrative appeal, pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1). Ex. E.
On February 12, 2019, DOCCS stated that it would not disclose this information. Ex. J.(February
12, 2019 email from Ms. Koolen, DOCCS). According to DOCCS’ Office of Counsel, “separatee
information is essentially an enemy list—it includes the names of inmates who cannot be housed
near or with an individual, [and] …any separatee information/list will be withheld in every 8000.5
case for serious safety concerns.” Id.
The categorical withholding of this information is contrary to law. See 8000.5(a)(2)(a)(13). The Board did not conduct an individualized analysis to determine whether withholding was
justified under the exceptions to disclosure. 3 Id. Therefore, this withholding was improper.

3

Mr.

objects to the withholding of this portion of the case record as to the administrative appeal.
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Mr.
was Denied Access to the Full COMPAS Report Prior to the
Parole Interview
On August 24, 2018, pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1), Mr.

submitted a written

request to review his case record in preparation for his November 2018 parole hearing. Ex. B. Mr.
was provided with a redacted copy of his 2018 COMPAS report. Ex. C. Since then, the
Board has provided Mr.

counsel with an un-redacted copy of his COMPAS report

pursuant to his request for his case record in connection with this administrative appeal. Ex. M.
The Board’s disclosure of the un-redacted 2018 COMPAS for the administrative appeal should be
a concession that the un-redacted 2018 COMPAS was unlawfully withheld from Mr.

in

connection with his November 2018 parole review.
II.

THE PAROLE BOARD BASED ITS DENIAL ON INACCURATE
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN MR.
PAROLE FILE.
The Board’s reliance on multiple inaccuracies in Mr.

case record requires a new

parole review. See Matter of Lewis v. Travis, 9 A.D.3d 800, 801 (3rd Dep’t., 2004) (holding “[i]n
as much as the Board relied on incorrect information in denying petitioner’s request for parole
release, the judgment must be reversed and a new hearing granted.”). Mr.

case record

contains multiple inaccuracies which the board relied on when denying his parole. First, the Board
based its decision on the incorrect belief that Mr.
Board relied on an inaccurate assessment Mr.

criminal history. Third, the Board’s relied

on a flawed COMPAS report that overinflated Mr
reflected that Mr.

shot the victim six times. Second, the

propensity for drug abuse, incorrectly

had no employment opportunities, and stated, without support, that Mr.

would incur financial hardship upon release. Each error is a ground for reversal.

8
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The Board’s Claim that the Victim was Shot Six Times is Inaccurate
The November 15, 2018 decision denying parole misstated the facts of the crime two times.
First, the Board stated:
“And when Police Officer

arrived you fired 6 rounds causing his death.”

Next, the Board stated:
“The majority of this Panel believes that your discretionary release at this time remains
incompatible with the welfare of the community which still suffers from your crime.
Shooting PO
six times causing his most painful death was so unnecessary given
the circumstances that your release at this time would so deprecate the serious nature of
your offense as to undermine respect for the law.”
Ex. G at 21:7-13. 4
However, the evidence contained in Mr.
testimony of Dr.

case record, which includes the trial

Chief Medical Examiner for the City of

and the January 24, 2017 letter from Mr.

(hereinafter “Dr.

trial defense attorney Mr. Michael D.

Stalonas, established that the victim was not shot six times. See Exs. K, L.
According to the prosecution’s witness, Dr.
than three times and as few as two. Dr.

the victim could have been shot no more

testified that there were “three entry perforations

and three exit perforations,” but that he could not tell with any degree of medical certainty if the
victim had been hit with three separate bullets, rather than two. Ex. L at 1336, 1348. Dr.
testified that one bullet could have caused two entry and exits wounds by entering and exiting the
forearm, then entering and exiting the chest. Id at 1347-1349. In essence, one bullet could have
made two entry wounds and two exit wounds. Dr.

could not determine whether the wounds

were caused by two bullets or three, but his testimony firmly established that the victim was not
shot six times. Ex. L at 1348.

4

It is unclear where this erroneous claim that Mr

fired six times and the victim was shot six times originated.
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Moreover, if defense counsel Stalonas’ January 24, 2017 letter, which was contained in
Mr.

parole file, had been reviewed, the Board would have been apprised of this error. Mr.

Stalonas’ letter stated, “it is patently obvious that PO

was hit by 2 or 3 bullets rather than

the 6 that are referred to in the Probation Report. It is not unusual to find erroneous information in
a Probation Report. The Minutes that reflect Dr.

testimony are clear and unambiguous. (2

or 3 bullets that struck the officer).” Ex. K. In addition, Mr.
minutes at P.40-41, [which] show that Officer

refers to “the sentencing

gun was fully discharged (6 bullets).”

Id. Even when directed to the correct information contained in both the trial transcript and the
sentencing minutes, 5 the Board erroneously asserted that the victim was shot six times. This error
is a ground for reversal.
The Parole Board Based Its Decision on an Inaccurate Criminal Conviction
Not Contained in Mr.
Criminal Record
The Board based its denial on an incorrect understanding of Mr.

criminal history. In its

November 15, 2018 decision denying parole, the Board stated that “[y]our history reflects a prior
firearms conviction. . . among your drug and gambling convictions commencing in 1974. “You
were on a bad path long before you shot your victim.” Ex. G at 21:20-22. Mr.

criminal

history began in 1977, not 1974. Ex. A. Although there is a record of an arrest in 1975 and another
in 1976, neither case resulted in a criminal conviction. Id. Thus, the Board relied on inaccurate
information in denying parole.
The Parole Board Relied on COMPAS Information Which Was Based on
Erroneous and Unsubstantiated Information
The 2018 COMPAS report contains multiple errors and is internally inconsistent. Ex. M.
First, the COMPAS report reflects a high risk of substance abuse that is not supported by Mr.

5

It is unclear whether the sentencing minutes were in the case record. If not, this is a ground for reversal as well.
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case record or medical summary. Second, the COMPAS report incorrectly reflects that
Mr

has no prospective employment. Third, Mr.

supporting evidence, that Mr.

COMPAS report states, without

would face financial difficulty. Each error is a ground for

reversal.
1.

The COMPAS Report Contains an Unsubstantiated Claim of a
Propensity for Drug Abuse

The Court of Appeals has held that, “[a]n action is arbitrary and capricious when it
is taken without sound basis in reason or regard to the facts. Matter of Peckham v.
Calogero, 12 N.Y.3d 424, 431 (2009). Mr.

was scored low in every category of the

2018 COMPAS except for substance abuse. Despite his thirty years of clean urinalyses,
Mr.

has been arbitrarily rated high for substance abuse upon release for the last

seven (7) years. Ex. M. (unredacted 2018 COMPAS report; Ex. N (unredacted 2016
COMPAS report; Ex. O (unredacted 2014 COMPAS report); and Ex. P (unredacted 2012
COMPAS report). Yet, high COMPAS scores in the area of substance abuse are not
supported by the information contained in Mr.

case record.

The 2018 COMPAS score for “ReEntry Substance Abuse” was seven (7). Ex. M
at 1/1, Risk Assessment, Criminogenic Need Scales Section.

The 2016 COMPAS score

for “ReEntry Substance Abuse” was nine (9). Ex. N at 1/1, Risk Assessment, Criminogenic
Need Scales Section. The 2014 COMPAS score for “ReEntry Substance Abuse” was a
seven (7). Ex. O at 1/1, Risk Assessment, Criminogenic Need Scales Section.

Last, the

2012 COMPAS score for “ReEntry Substance Abuse” was a nine (9). Ex. P at 1/1,
COMPAS ReEntry Risk Assessment.
In the last seven years, Mr.

COMPAS scores have fluctuated despite there

being little to no differences in the answers to the substance abuse questions and no change
in the language of the narrative to suggest any reason for the change in score. The
11
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Criminogenic Needs Narrative Summary in the 2018, 2016, 2014 and 2012, all contain
nearly the same word for word boilerplate language. This together with the arbitrary
volatility in the substance abuse scores suggest an unreliable assessment of Mr. substance abuse risk. None of these narratives explain why Mr. -

presents as someone

likely to have a drug or alcohol problem. Moreover, the 2018 COMPAS repo1t states that
"it is not clear to the inte1viewer whether Mr.

was at risk for substance

abuse problems," in the Criminogenic Needs Narrative Summaiy. Additionally, under the
section titled, Substance Use, question number 24 reads, "Is this person at risk for substance
abuse problems?" The checked response states "Unsure." Yet, Mr. -

is rated with a

seven (7), placing him in the highly probable range ..
The only document that suggests Mr. -

has a drug problem does so by

conflating possession and abuse. Ex. Q (November 2012 Reappearance Inmate Status
Repo1i). Mr. -

2012 Pai·ole Board Appeai·ance Report states, "the instant offense

involves possessing a large quantity of Heroin and he would benefit from mug testing and
treatment." The document never states that Mr. -

used or abused drugs but c01Telates

possession with abuse. However, correlation does not imply causation.
Additionally, in 2018, 2016, and 2012, the question as to whether Mr. committed offenses while high/diunk, was answered as "unsure" despite medical rep01ts
that confum Mr. -

was not under the influence dming the crime. Ex. R (April 15,

1980 Toxicology Exam Showing Iv.fr. -

Tested Negative for PCP). The 2014

COMPAS is the only report that accurately indicates that Mr. -

was not high/diunk

when he committed the offenses. The COMPAS substance abuse scores are based on
inaccurate info1mation and va1y inexplicably over the years; therefore, reliance on such
scores was arbitraiy and capricious.
12
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2.

The COMPAS Report Erroneously Stated that Mr.
Employment Plans

In preparation for his November 2018 Parole interview, Mr.

Had No
submitted a

parole packet which contained an offer of employment and three interviews should he be
released, yet his 2018 COMPAS report erroneously stated Mr.

had no employment

offers. Ex. M, at Pg. 4 of 6, Work and Financial, #28.
Mr.

has earned his high school diploma, two associate degrees and acquired

a number of vocational skills during his tenure. As a result of his achievements, several
organizations extended offers for interviews or employment. Yet, the 2018 COMPAS
report stated “Mr.

did not appear to have an employment plan and appeared

likely to face employability problems upon release”. Ex. M at 5/5, Re-Entry Employment
Expectations. In the Work and Financial Section, question number 28 reads, “What are
the current employment plans?” The checked response states “No employment plan.” It
should be noted that these statements were redacted from the copy provided to Mr.
Ex. C, at 4/6, Work and Financial section.
Specifically, Mr.

had a letter from

Enterprise to interview

for a job to do community outreach, administrative work, gallery painting and maintenance.
See Parole Packet at 23.
interview Mr.

, the director of

, committed to

for an “open position handling gallery operations, if released.” See

Parole Packet at 24. Furthermore, Dr.
committed to interview Mr.

, faculty at
for any number of the open administrative,

maintenance, or janitorial positions. See Parole Packet at 25. 6

6

Mr.
with the assistance of volunteers from the Parole Preparation Project submitted a parole packet, which contained
community support and employment (and interview) letters. The entire parole packet is not included with this brief because it is
voluminous and is part of the case record/parole file.

13
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Finally, Mr.

offered Mr.

a position working for t

. Mr. Burns states, “[n]ot only can I offer [Mr.

] employment,

but I can provide him with training programs that I direct and hold regularly that include
the 30-hour OSHA requirement, Non-Union Apprenticeship Trades Training and Job
Placement for construction work.” See Parole Packet at 26. Although the parole board
made mention of Mr.

employment offers in the interview, there is no evidence

that the parole board considered the offer for employment extended to Mr.

. Ex. G

at 14:7-9. Therefore, question twenty-eight of the 2018 COMPAS report inaccurately
reflects that Mr.
3.

had no employment plans.

The COMPAS Report Erroneously Reflects an Unsubstantiated Claim
that Mr.
Would Incur Financial Difficulties Upon Release

The July 2018 COMPAS report is internally inconsistent with regard to financial
difficulty. The COMPAS report states that Mr.

would incur financial difficulties

upon release. This assertion is not supported by the case record or Mr.

parole

packet. Therefore, because the Board relied on inconsistent information without a sound
basis in fact, the decision cannot stand.
In preparation for his November 2018 parole hearing, Mr

had his parole

packet professionally prepared by the Parole Preparation Project. Contained within this
122 page document were letters of community support, letters of support from family and
friends, and Mr.

institutional accomplishment. See Parole Packet at 16-20, 28-69,

71-87. In addition, as stated above, Mr.

most recent parole packet contained three

offers for job interviews and one firm offer of employment upon release. See Parole Packet
at 23-26. Despite the overwhelming communal and family support and employment
opportunities, however, Mr.

2018 COMPAS report reflected, without evidence,

14
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that he would face financial difficulty upon release. Ex. M at 4/5, Re-entry Financial and
5/5, Re-Entry Employment Expectations.
Moreover, on page 5/5 of the Re-entry Financial section, after Mr

stated

that (1) “money will not be a problem when he is released,” (2) “it will not be difficult to
manage his money,” (3) “it would not be difficult to have enough money to get by,” and
(4) “that supporting himself without illegal means would not be difficult,” the 2018
COMPAS reported that “Mr.

expected to have financial problems upon

release.” Additionally, under the Work and Financial Section, question number 30 reads
“Does this person face employability problems upon release?” The checked response
states, “Yes.”

Further, question number 30 reads, “Will this person have financial

problems upon release?” The checked response states, “Yes.” Ex.. M at 5/5, Re-entry
Financial section. Again, it should be noted that these statements were redacted from the
copy provided to Mr.
documents contained in Mr.

. These statements are inaccurate and disproven by the
case record. These statements also incorrectly

suggest, contrary to the case record, that Mr.

would suffer financial difficulties upon

release.
III.

THE PAROLE BOARD’S DECISION VIOLATES THE POSITIVE STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS SET FORTH BY THE LEGISLATURE
The Board’s decision must be “in accordance with and not violative of any positive

statutory requirement, lest it be subject to review. See, In the Matter of Rabenbauer v. New York
State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision, 46 Misc.3d 603,606-07 (Sup. Ct.
Sullivan Cnty, 2014). Here, the Board: (1) considered community opposition that expressed penal
philosophy in violation of Exec. L. 259-i et seq; see also King v. New York State Div. of Parole,
83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (the Board must provide the inmate with a proper hearing in which
only the relevant guidelines are considered; (2) rendered its decision conclusory terms in violation
15
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of Exec. L. 259-i(2)(a); (3) failed to consider the statement from Mr.

defense attorney,

Mr. Micheal Stalonas in violation of Exec. L. 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii); (4) failed to advise Mr.
of its consideration of separatee information in violation of 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1); see also,
Matter of Almonor v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc.3d 1126 [A] (Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty, 2007); and
(5) based its denial solely on the seriousness of the instant offense in violation of Exec. L. 259i(2)(a); see also King, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dept. 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“it is
unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of the applicable statutory
factors as to every person who comes before it.”) As discussed below, each one of these violations
is a separate ground for reversal.
The Board considered “Community Opposition” that Expressed Penal
Philosophy
The Board relied on “opposition” letters that conveyed penal philosophy, which is contrary
to law. See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (“There is evidence
in the record that petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing because one of the Commissioners
considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute, including penal philosophy”).
Pending the content, “opposition” letters received from public officials and members of the
community may be considered by the Parole Board when making a parole decision. See Clark v.
New York State Bd. Of Parole, 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dep’t., 2018) (“the Board permissibly
considered letters in opposition to the parole application submitted by public officials and members
of the community”).

Here, however, the Board considered and relied upon “community

opposition” letters that conveyed penal philosophy, all of it from persons who appear to have had
no personal knowledge of Mr

or the victim and some from persons who do not reside in

New York State. This kind of opposition material should not have been considered by the Board.
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The vast majority of the letters considered by the Board were identical and conveyed the
opinion that anyone who kills a police officer should never be released—this is penal philosophy.
See Exs. S, T (sample portions of opposition letters contained in case record). See King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423 (1st Dept. 1993), aff’d, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“The
role of the Parole Board is not to resentence petitioner according to the personal opinions of its
members as to the appropriate penalty for murder…”). Of the 82 opposition letters that can be
directly connected to the 2018 parole hearing, 80 focus on what Mr.

“proper punishment”

should be. Seventy-six (76) of the 80 aforementioned letters contain the following statement word
for word: “Justice demands that he be made to spend every remaining day of his full sentence in
prison.” Ex. S, T. In addition, each of the 76 identical letters premise the opposition to release on
the status of the victim. Each letter states that the victim was a veteran of the United States Army
and New York Police Department, and that he was a husband and father. Ex. S. The Board is not
permitted to value the life of a police officer over that of other crime victims and therefore, should
not consider opposition material that conveys this kind of penal philosophy. See King, 190 A.D.2d
at 433, 434 (stating that the Board may not have an automatic denial of parole because the victim
was a police officer).
Furthermore, of the remaining 4 opposition letters that convey penal philosophy, one is
from an organization that has sent three identical “opposition letters” that vary in date only. Ex. T
(December 29, 2014, December 28, 2016 and September 25, 2018). The letters are from a police
union whose interest in Mr.

case is premised on keeping all persons convicted of killing

of police officers in prison. 7 Each letter advocates denial of parole because the victim was a police
officer. Thus, the Board impermissibly relied on penal philosophy.

7 The Detectives Endowment Association states in relation to another parole applicant’s hearing “the DEA sent an anti-parole

letter, as always.” (emphasis added) https://www nycdetectives.org/news/keep-cop-killer-herman-bell-prison/
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“Opposition letters” should only be considered if the author conveys specific knowledge
of the case at hand rather than spouting personal opinions. A letter from a self-proclaimed “exconvict” from Texas, 8 who established his “credentials” based on his experience with “savage
criminals who have no respect for law enforcement” illustrates the irrationality of considering
“opposition letters” that convey penal philosophy. The author opposes release because, even
though he will “never reoffend,” he is one of “the minorities.” This writer demonstrates no
knowledge of Mr.

conduct or achievements since being incarcerated, yet he assumes Mr.

has not been rehabilitated and is at risk for reoffending. Ex. S at 1.
In contrast, the 28 letters written on behalf of Mr.
were unique letters that conveyed personal knowledge of Mr.

that were in his parole packet,
. See Parole Packet at 28-60.

Furthermore, 18 of these letters speak to the role the author will play in supporting Mr.
re-entry into society, an integral statutory factor when considering a person for parole. See id. at
28-31, 34, 37, 39-44, 48, 50-52, 54-57, 59, 60.
Some letters were impermissibly considered because they appear to have been sent from
states other than New York State. Although the Board redacted the address of each sender, on
several letters the state of origin is still visible. 9 One came from Wisconsin, another from Illinois.
Ex. S at 2, 4. Residents of other states should not be considered to be part of the relevant “members
of the community” for the purpose of determining whether a person should be released to parole
supervision in New York State. And, it should be explained how residents of other states are part
of the “community which still suffers from your crime.” Ex. G at 23. Furthermore, due to

8 Due to the excessive redaction, the current location of the author cannot be confirmed but the body of the letter attests to

incarceration in the state of Texas.
In Clark v. New York State Bd. Of Parole, 2018 N.Y. Slip. Op. 30745 (U) (Trial Order), aff’d., 166 A.D.3d 531 (1st Dept. 2018),
the Court held that while the parole board has the authority to maintain the confidentiality of records, it also places limits on said
restrictions as stated above. Id. at *6. The Court further held “that while the regulations provide a basis to redact or withhold
records . . . there must be an appropriate analysis to determine whether disclosing the information would harm anyone, let alone
the community at large.” The city and state of origin as well as the date received does not provide enough information about the
sender to allow harm to occur to them; therefore redaction is unnecessary and not consistent with the regulations. See 9 NYCRR
8000.5(a)(2)(a)(2).
9
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redactions, it is impossible to determine whether many more “opposition letters” were sent from
outside New York State. Ex. S.
Beyond the inclusion of penal philosophy, the verbiage of 90% of the opposition letters is
word for word the same letter. Ex. S. The use of a boilerplate letter indicates that an individual or
an organization is organizing opposition to the release of Mr

. Therefore the number of

letters received reflected the organizing ability of the law enforcement community rather than the
“community.” Lastly, the boilerplate opposition letter is antithetical to the Board’s claim that there
was “significant” opposition to Mr.

release. Ex. G at 22. If the board were to consider

only unique letters of opposition the total would be approximately six letters which is a far cry
from “significant opposition.” Id.
Moreover, even if there were thousands of identical letters, this may only indicate the
organizing abilities and resources of one sector of society—in this case the law enforcement
community. That Mr.

does not have the resources to organize an on-line campaign to solicit

letters of support does not mean that an equal number of members of society would not support
his release. Reliance on “opposition” that is generated by efforts akin to political campaigning,
reduces the Board to counting votes and succumbing to political pressure. As such “opposition” is
beyond the statutory factors delineated in Exec. L. 259-i et seq and the Board’s consideration of
such requires reversal.
The Board Failed to Explain the Reason for Denial in Detail
The Board’s decision cited two of three statutory standards it must consider in determining
parole but failed to explain in detail why, in applying Mr.

facts to those two standards,

parole was not appropriate. In determining parole, the Board was required to consider whether, if
released, Mr.

(1) “will live and remain at liberty without violating the law,” (2) whether

“his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society,” and (3) he “will not so deprecate the
19
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seriousness of his crime as to undermine respect for law.” Exec. L. 259-i(c)(A). The Board was
also required to inform Mr

“…of the factors and reasons for such denial of parole,” and

“[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not in conclusory terms.” Exec. L. 259-i (a) (emphasis
added). See also In re Ciaprazi v. Evans, 52 Misc.3d 1212(A) (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co., 2016)
(concluding that the use of boilerplate terms do not effectively provide the details necessary to
allow for judicial review and reversal of a parole denial). Here, the Board cited statutory language
rather than provide a detailed explanation as to why two out of the three commissioners denied
parole.
As to the first standard, the Board appears to have determined that Mr.

would live

and remain at liberty without violating the law since the commissioners did not cite that standard
as a basis for denying parole. Ex. G at 21. Therefore, despite the Board noting that Mr.
2018 COMPAS score was probable for risk of substance abuse, it determined there was no
reasonable probability that Mr.

would violate the law. Ex. G at 22.

As to the second standard, whether release would be incompatible with the welfare of
society, the Board did not explain why, if Mr.

were to be released to parole supervision, it

would be incompatible with the welfare of society. First, the Board applied the wrong standard.
The Board stated: “Given the magnitude of your crime…release is incompatible with the welfare
of the community which still suffers from your crime.” Ex. G at 23. The Board did not consider
the welfare of society as a whole; instead, the Board considered the welfare of only a portion of
society—that “which still suffers from the crime.” Second, even if the Board were permitted to
consider only the welfare of a fraction of society, the Board does not specify the community to
which it refers. Third, even if the Board were permitted to consider only a specified community
within society, the Board did not identify the sub-section of society to which it referred nor explain
how the release of Mr.

would be incompatible with that portion of society’s welfare.
20
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The Board must explain why it reached its decision. See In In re McBride v. Evans, 42
Misc.3d 1230(A) (Sup. Ct. Dutchess Co. 2014) (“The Board gave no analysis as to how or why it
reached this conclusion. It appears to have focused only on petitioner’s past behavior without
articulating a rational basis for reaching its conclusion that his release would be incompatible with
the welfare of society at this time.”). This is all the more true, when all other factors strongly
establish that release would not be incompatible with the welfare of society. Ex. G at 22
(demonstrating positive factors such as a low overall compass score, detailed case plan with goals
achieved and in progress, multiple commendations, awards and certificates for completion of
voluntary programs, two Associate’s Degrees, a variety of vocational skills, and participation in a
variety of therapeutic programs and cultural organizations). The Board’s decision does not explain
why release would be detrimental to the “good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity” of
society

as

a

whole.

See

Welfare,

Merriam-Webster,

https://www.merriam-

webster.com/dictionary/welfare (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (defining welfare as “the state of doing
well especially in respect to good fortune, happiness, well-being, or prosperity.”).
As to the third standard, the Board failed to explain why Mr.

release to parole

supervision would so deprecate the serious of the offense as to undermine respect for the law. The
board described the victim: he was “a father, a son and husband,” and was “loved, respected and
[h]eld in high regard.” Ex. G at 22. The Board also focused on the number of times the victim
was shot. 10 Id. But, these facts do not, without more, explain why release would undermine
respect for the law. First, the characteristics of a victim are not valid reasons for denying parole
because the Board is not permitted to value the life of one victim more than another. King v. New
York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788, 791 (1994) (stating that the parole board must conduct
a parole hearing using only the relevant guidelines listed at N.Y. Exec. Law. 259-i(2)(c)(A)).)

10

The Board inaccurately inflated the number of times the victim was shot. See Section III(A) above.
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Whether a victim is loved or un-loved, a father or childless is not a reason for denying parole. Any
one person or even society as a whole may mourn more deeply when a young person, a police
officer, or revered public figure is murdered, but the applicable law does not permit the Parole
Board to deny parole based on the nature of the victim. Second, the law set a minimum penalty of
31 years. Mr.

has served eight years beyond the minimum. Therefore, release at this time

is permitted by law. Since the law permits release at this time, the Board failed to explain in detail
why release at this time would undermine respect for the law.
Moreover, the Board’s reference to “significant community opposition” does not explain
why release would be incompatible with the welfare of society nor why release would undermine
respect for the law. Ex. G at 22. The Board does not explain the source nor the nature of the
community opposition it relied upon. The vast majority of the opposition was seventy-six carbon
copy letters that voiced penal philosophy. See Ex. S. In addition, whether to grant parole should
not be a popularity contest in which the Board weighs opposition versus support. The Board’s
failure to explain beyond the conclusory statement of “significant community opposition”
completely contradicts the statute’s express declaration that “[s]uch reasons shall be given in detail
and not in conclusory terms.” Exec. L. § 259-i(a). See also West v New York State Bd. Of Parole,
41 Misc. 3D 1214(A) (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013) (holding that the Parole Board must provide a
“detailed written explanation [which] is necessary to enable intelligent judicial review of the
Board’s decision.”)
The Board’s failure to explain in detail risks that the Board may have considered factors
outside the scope of the statute. See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994)
(affirming the appellate division’s decision “that petitioner was not afforded a proper hearing
because one of the Commissioners considered factors outside the scope of the applicable statute.”).
The Board’s failure to explain in detail requires reversal.
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The Board Failed to Consider Mr.

Defense Attorney’s Statement

The Board is statutorily required to review letters from the parole applicant’s defense
attorney. Exec. L. 259-i(c)(A)(vii) (Stating “recommendations of the sentencing court, the district
attorney, the attorney for the inmate” shall be considered.); see also, In re King v. N.Y. State Div.
of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 431 (1st Dep’t 1993), aff’d. 83 N.Y.2d 788 (1994) (“[I]t is
unquestionably the duty of the Board to give fair consideration to each of the applicable statutory
factors as to every person who comes before it, and where the record convincingly demonstrates
that the board did in fact fail to consider the proper standards, the courts must intervene.”).
Because the Board failed to consider a January 24, 2017 letter from Mr.

trial attorney, a

new parole review should be granted.
The November 2018 Parole Board Report does not indicate that a letter was requested or
received from Mr.
Mr.

defense attorney. Ex. L (November 2018 Parole Board report). Yet,

Parole Packet, submitted to the Board in advance of Mr

November 7, 2018

trial counsel, Michael D. Stalonas. 11 Ex. L

interview date, included a letter from Mr
(Stalonas letter included in Parole Packet at 69).
Mr. Stalonas’ letter commends Mr.
corrects the erroneous assertion that Mr.
required to review Mr.

institutional progress and achievements and
shot the victim six times. Id. The Board was

January 24, 2017 letter, but there is no indication it did so. Ex.

G. While there was mention of a D.A. letter, there is absolutely no mention of Mr.
January 24, 2017 letter nor is receipt of it indicated on the parole board report. Ex. D. The Board’s
failure to consider trial counsel’s letter is evidenced by the Board’s continued erroneous assertion
that Mr.

shot the victim six times. Ex. G at 23:10-13.

Had the Board considered Mr.

11 Mr
with the assistance of volunteers from the Parole Preparation Project submitted a parole packet, which contained
Mr. Stalonas’ January 24, 2017 letter at page 69. The entire parole packet is not included with this brief because it is voluminous
and is part of the case record.
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January 24, 2017 letter, it would have learned that the victim was “hit by 2 or 3 bullets
rather than the six that are referred to in the Probation Report.” Ex. L. This fact is also
corroborated by the trial transcript of the prosecution’s witness Dr. Gross. Ex. K. at 1336. Failure
to consider defense counsel’s letter is a statutory violation of Exec. L. 259-i(2)(c)(A)(vii) and
requires the denial be reversed.
The Board Failed to Provide An Individualized Reason for Departing from
Eleven Out of Twelve COMPAS Scores
Mr.

COMPAS scored him as low risk in eleven out of twelve categories, yet the

Board denied parole and failed to explain why it departed from each score. As to “Risk for
Felony Violence,” “Arrest Risk,” and “Abscond Risk,” Mr.

was deemed to be at the

lowest level of risk, scoring a one on a scale of ten on the COMPAS. Ex. C. He also scored low
in “Criminal Involvement,” “History of Violence” and “Prison Misconduct.” Id. And, the
COMPAS determined Mr.

was unlikely to have “Negative Social Cognitions,” Low Self-

Efficacy/Optimism,” and “Low Family Support,” and unlikely to have problems with “ReEntry
Financial” and “ReEntry Employment Expectations.” Yet, the Board denied

release

to parole supervision.
The regulations governing parole decision-making require that:
“In making a release determination, the Board shall be guided by risk and needs
principles, including the inmate’s risk and needs scores as generated by a periodicallyvalidated risk assessment instrument, if prepared by the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision (collectively, ‘Department of Risk and Needs Assessment’). If a
Board determination, denying release, departs from the Department Risk and Needs
Assessment’s scores, the Board shall specify any scale within the Department Risk and
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Needs Assessment from which it departed and provide an individualized reason for such
departure.”
9 NYCCRR §8002.2(a). In denying parole to Mr.
in which Mr.

, the Board departed from all the scales

received a low risk score. But, the Board failed to specify any scale from

which it departed, and failed to provide an individualized reason for doing so as to each scale.
The Parole Board Impermissibly Considered “Separatee Information”
Without Informing Mr.
.
It is not clear whether or not Mr.

case record contained “separatee information,”

but if so, the Board failed to state its consideration of such. On August 24, 2018, four months prior
to his November 2018 parole hearing, Mr.

submitted a written request to review his case

record pursuant to 9 NYCRR 8000.5(c)(1). Ex. A. On August 27, 2018, Mr.

received what

appears to be a form letter advising him that “separatee information would be withheld.” Ex. A
(indicating that “the following records WILL NOT be made available for review. . . separatee
information.”). If separatee information was in the file, the Board had an obligation to disclose its
consideration of such material. See Matter of Almonor v. NYS Bd. of Parole, 16 Misc.3d 1126 [A]
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. Cnty, 2007) (“even though, on some occasions, 9 NYCRR 8000.5 allows
respondent to consider materials. . . protected from a parole applicant’s review, respondent would
not have the right to keep the fact of their consideration secret from the applicant.”). As the
Board’s decision did not disclose consideration of such information in connection with Mr.
parole application, the non-disclosure violates 9 NYCRR 8000.5 by keeping the fact of
consideration of separatee information a secret from Mr.

and is grounds for reversal.

The Parole Board Based Its Denial Solely on the Seriousness of the Instant
Offense
In 2011, the legislature made changes to Executive Law 259(c)(4). “The changes were
intended to focus the parole boards away from focusing on the severity or heinous nature of the
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instant offense, to a forward-thinking paradigm to evaluate whether an inmate is rehabilitated and
ready for release.” Platten v. NYS Bd. Of Parole, 47 Misc.3d 1059, 1062 (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty,
2015). While the parole board has wide discretion, a parole board cannot base its decision solely
on the serious nature of the underlying offense. Id. at 1063. Additionally, a parole board cannot
retry an inmate, harass, badger or argue with an inmate, second guess the findings of competent
experts involved in the inmate’s trial or infuse their own personal beliefs into the proceeding. Id.
(citing King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1st Dept. 1993) aff'd 83
N.Y.2d 1277 (1994). It is not the role of the parole board to resentence the petitioner according to
the personal opinions of its members as to the appropriate penalty for murder, but to determine
whether, as of this moment, given all the relevant statutory factors, he should be released. See
King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1st Dept. 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d 1277
(1994) (emphasis added). Likewise, the Board cannot unduly focus on the nature of the crime, for
it is but one factor; the board must assess the applicant as [he] is today and how he has prepared
[himself] for release back into society. See Matter of Rossakis v. New York State Bd. of Parole,
146 A.D.3d 22, 26 (1st Dept. 2016).
Furthermore, “the legislature has determined that a murder conviction per se should not
preclude parole, there must be a showing of some aggravating circumstances beyond the inherent
seriousness of the crime itself.” King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 433 (1st
Dept. 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d 1277 (1994). A decision by the parole board to deny parole solely
because the case involves the death of a police officer is a breach of the obligation legislatively
imposed upon it to render a qualitative judgment based upon a review of all the relevant factors.
See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 434 (1st Dept. 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d
1277 (1994). Thus, a decision that is not in accord with the statutory requirements cannot stand.
See King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 430 (1st Dept. 1993), aff'd 83 N.Y.2d
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1277 (1994); see also, In the Matter of Rabenbauer v. New York State Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision, 46 Misc.3d 603,606-08, (Sup. Ct. Sullivan Cnty, 2014).
On February 12, 1980, Mr.

caused the death of a police officer. Ex. G at 7:6-8. Mr.

was convicted of second degree murder and sentenced to 25 years to life, plus an additional
6 years for drug possession. After exercising his direct appeal, instead of continuing to appeal his
conviction, Mr.
at 5:10-13.

accepted responsibility for his actions and decided to work on himself. Id.

Over the course of the next thirty-eight years Mr.

amassed “multiple

commendations, awards and certificates for completion of voluntary programs.” Id. at 22:6-8).
Additionally, Mr.

earned two Associate degrees, a variety of vocational skills and

participated in therapeutic programs and cultural organizations. 12
Here, as in King, the Board focused solely on the nature of Mr.

offense and

mentioned his institutional achievements in passing, without analysis and only to dismiss them.
Further, the board’s review of Mr.

did not determine “whether as of this moment, given all

the relevant statutory facts, he should be released,” but seeks to resentence him for the shooting of
a police officer. King v. New York State Div. of Parole, 190 A.D.2d 423, 432 (1st Dept. 1993),
aff'd 83 N.Y.2d 1277 (1994). The Board’s decision stated that Mr.

“was on a bad path,”

and that his behavior over thirty (30) years ago, “speaks to your selfishness, poor judgment, and
callous disregard.” These statement do not reflect the forward-looking approach the Board is
statutorily mandated to apply, the man Mr.

is today, nor do they comport with the board’s

own statement that “we believe your remorse is sincere and genuine and that you are a better man
today.” Ex. G at 22:15-16).

12 Mr.

with the assistance of volunteers from the Parole Preparation Project submitted a parole packet, which contained
letters of organizational support, pgs. 16-20 and past commendations awards and program certificates, pgs. 71-87. The entire
parole packet is not included with this brief because it is part of the case record.
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Despite every indication that Mr.

is ready for parole and has served eight years more

than his minimum sentence, the Board denied parole because of the “magnitude” of the crime.
The Board stated: “given the magnitude of your crime, the majority of this panel believes that your
discretionary release at this time remains incompatible with the welfare of the community which
still suffers from your crime.” Ex. G at 23:7-10. The Board appears to have determined that the
murder at issue here is of a greater magnitude than other murders because of the number of times
the victim was shot and because the victim was a police officer. As to the nature of the victim,
the King Court, in which the murder victim was a police officer, found that the nature of the victim
did not alone establish an aggravating factor that would permit denial of parole based solely upon
the crime.
The Board appears to stress the number of times the victim was shot in order to establish
that the murder was unjustified. Ex. F. at 23:10-13 (“shooting PO

six times causing his

most painful death was so unnecessary”). Yet the Board’s claim that the victim was shot six is
inaccurate. See supra Section III(A). First, as stated above, the victim was only shot two to three
times. See, Id. Second, every murder conviction is an unjustified killing, otherwise it is not
murder. Therefore, the number of times the victim was shot does not establish an aggravating
factor that would permit denial based solely on the nature of the crime. However, even if it did,
that factor would not be applicable in Mr.

case as he did not shoot the victim six times.

Therefore, because the parole board focused solely on the nature of the instant offense,
disregarded factual information regarding same and failed to establish any aggravating factors to
justify such in violation of Exec. L. 259-i(2)(a) and King, the denial should be reversed.
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CONCLUSION
Therefore, because Mr. ~

as denied access to portions of his case record, the Board

based its denial on inaccurate information, and the Board's decision violated positive statutory
requirements, Mr. ~

hould be granted a new parole hearing before a panel that does not

include the commissioners who denied parole.
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